THE CHANGES
Bhorgi’s system is outlined below.

In Bielsa’s system the attack was proactive while the defence was reactive. Bielsa always wanted to have a spare defender so would move from two to three center-backs depending on how the opposition lined up. Bhorgi uses three permanent center-backs but Vidal is given licence to move into midfield when he sees fit. Medel and Carmona patrol the center of midfield, with Medel being the destroyer while Carmona holds his position defending the hole and protecting against counter-attacks . In Bielsa’s system Carmona often defended this zone on his own leaving huge gaps for the opposition to exploit on the counter . Isla and Beausejour play as wingbacks but they do not have any wingers helping them to defend the flanks. Valdivia plays as a classic number 10, given a free role to control the play and create chances for the strikers. Upfront Sanchez or Jimenez plays off the center forward, usually Suazo but against France it was the youngster Rubio. This current Chile team seems to be set up to press teams in central areas and force them to attack down the flanks

SOME WEAKNESSES

The weaknesses of a 3 man defence are well known. Against a one striker system one of the spare center-backs is wasted and leaves the team outnumbered in other areas. The team also has a weakness down the flanks because the space behind the wingbacks can be exploited.

All of Chile's weaknesses on show

In the game against France both weaknesses were plain to see. As seen in the image above Karim Benzema(red) often moved out to the left wing to exploit the space behind Isla. Benzema does not play as a traditional center-forward and loves to drift out wide to receive the ball, something that happened many times in this game. As he does so one of the center-backs comes with him but the other two centerbacks(yellow) are left in the penalty box with no one to pick up. Two French players are waiting at the far post(blue) and are only picked up by one Chilean defender. This is a poor allocation of resources and it is this  situation that lead to France’s goal.

Another weakness has to do with Chile’s pressing game. In Bielsa’s system the wingers could apply direct pressure to the opposition’s fullbacks and force them to release the ball quickly. In Borghi’s system there are no classic wingers and the wingback is expected to press the opposing fullback. This is a problem because the wingback also has to worry about any wingers in behind him so he ends up being caught in two minds. It is too easy for the opposition to create two on one situations against Isla and Beausejour. In the image above Clichy(purple) is not being picked up because Isla is occupied by the French winger. France’s fullbacks were given a lot of time and space and if Clichy and Sagna were better crossers of the ball they could have made Chile pay.

CONCLUSION

Chile’s new formation gives them greater protection against the counter attack but leaves them weak on the flanks. The use of three permanent center-backs creates problems when playing against a one striker system. Chile may have lost their flexibility and reactive tendencies but they are still a joy to watch.

THEORY INTO PRACTICE

The point of zonal marking is to defend the danger zones at corners, which are the near post and the area around the penalty spot. The team is set up so that the best headers defend these zones regardless of how the opposition lines up. A final point is that after the initial ball is cleared from the corner, all defenders must move forward quickly away from the goal line in order to create an offside trap.

Barcelona's set up when defending corners

The image above shows how Barcelona typically line up when defending corners. As you can see the Barcelona players are mostly ignoring what the opposition (Mallorca) are doing and sticking to their zones. Pique(red) usually defends the near post zone and Puyol patrols the penalty spot zone. This makes sense as they are the best headers of the ball in the team. In the image above, Milito(blue) has replaced Puyol but the zonal assignments remain the same. Xavi (yellow) usually stand in front of Pique to cut out the low flat corners that teams use as a surprise tactic. Another key player is Iniesta (black) who stands close to the edge of the penalty box, clearly not picking anyone up. His role is to prevent the cut- back corner to the shooters lurking just outside of the penalty area. All the other defenders patrol the penalty box zone to deal with knock-downs in case the initial ball is not cleared.

One last thing to note is that Barcelona do not put any players on the goal line at either of the goal posts. This is considered HERESY in British football but Barcelona do it all the time with success. The reason they dont put any players on the goal line is because it would be very difficult to create an offside trap after the initial ball is cleared. This was the flaw in Mexico’s implementation of zonal marking, the player on the far post kept playing people onside as he was late to push up.

In this specific game Mallorca scored when Pique, the most important defender, missed his header. This shows that no matter how good the tactic is, the players still have to execute their roles for  it to be effective.

Barcelona clearly not man marking

Above we have Barcelona zonal marking against Arsenal in the Champions League. The set up is the same but the personnel has changed. Pique and Puyol were not available so Busquets was defending the near post zone and Abidal was defending the penalty spot zone. Xavi and Iniesta are in their usual roles cutting off the surprise corners. We see that there is an Arsenal player standing right in front of Valdes but Barcelona ignore him and just stick to their zones. Most teams would man mark this player as they do not want him blocking off the goalkeeper but this would go against the theory of zonal marking. Once again Barcelona have no players standing at either post.

In this game it is again the near post zone defender (Busquets) who makes an error and the opposition scores, proving just how important his role is in this tactic.

CONCLUSION

Barcelona’s zonal marking system covers up for their lack of height and makes them very difficult to score against from corners. The system only needs 2 or 3 good headers of the ball because the other players perform tasks that do not require aerial ability. They have shown that strategy and concentration are more important than height when it comes to defending corners. Teams with short players could learn a lot from this system and use similar ideas to overcome their physical weaknesses.

When Chelsea paid Benfica €25 million for their defender, David Luiz, it was a signal of intent. Worried about teams learning how to ‘park the bus’ at Stamford Bridge and escape with a point, Carlo Ancelotti forked out for a player who has the ability to unlock deep lying defences with his attacking instincts. While Luiz is doubtless a solid and athletic defensive player, he has been signed predominantly for his eagerness to link up with midfield and forward lines. After only a handful of games in England Luiz already seems more capable of revolutionising Chelsea’s attacking game than a centre forward for whom Chelsea paid twice as much.

The Modern Libero

Attacking from deep

Luiz is a modern day sweeper, if you like. At Benfica he played at left back or in the centre of defence, but regardless of his starting position invariably looked to forage at any given opportunity. Scheidts Football Miscellany points out if Luiz was English there is no way he would be a defender; he is far too good on the ball for traditionalist British coaches to see him as a defensive player. He has the skill and flair of a trequartista, not to mention the hairstyle. Nonetheless a place in the back line suits him well as he can attack from deep and cause havoc, as nobody will be quite sure who should be picking him up as he moves between the lines. Teams facing The Blues could do worse than designate a forward player to keep an eye on Luiz’s rampages and track him back when he does.

Other such players include Daniel Agger of Liverpool, Thomas Vermaelen of Arsenal and Tiago Silva of Milan, but none of them go forward with the same frequency as Luiz. For a team employing one of this breed of attacking defender it is essential they include at least one midfielder who is capable of slotting into the vacated position during a game.

Midfielders’ responsibilities

Chelsea have an abundance of defensive midfielders (Michael Essien, John Obi Mikel, Ramires) who can all cover at centre back, and this is probably why Ancelotti was so keen to utilise this tactic. While John Terry likes to stride out of defence to good effect, he is losing his pace (which was always average at best) and stamina, and will probably not cross the half way line in open play too often when playing alongside Luiz.

This season Arsene Wenger employs both Alexander Song and Jack Wilshire in defensive midfield positions in a 4-2-3-1 structure, which allows for the creative instincts of Thomas Vermaelen as well as freeing fullbacks Gael Clichy and Bacary Sagna. At Liverpool, Daniel Agger is commonly regarded as one of the best ball-playing centre backs in the Premier League. He too is helped by a duo of defensive players shielding the back four, in the form of Lucas Leiva and A N Other. Unfortunately we have not yet seen Liverpool unlock Agger’s potential as an attacking force, as their poor couple of seasons along with the Dane’s injury record has hindered the development of this tactic at Anfield. Meanwhile, Milan’s typically Italian outlook includes not two but three defensive minded midfielders, who can all step in to play in Silva’s position.

Which came first?

We are faced with something of a chicken-egg situation: some teams have bought in an attacking defender because they have defensive midfield players, while others sign defensive midfielders to protect their team when their sweeper fancies a stroll into opposition territory. With Chelsea it’s the former. For Arsenal, Wenger has a history of signing defenders who have the talent to play further forward, in fact William Gallas was so eager to join the attack and score goals he even wore the number 10 shirt. However, when the Frenchman was at the club Arsenal were often vulnerable to counter attacks, as they only employed one holding player (Song). This season it is no coincidence that despite Wenger’s refusal to sign a recognised world class centre back, The Gunners have been far more dependable at the back (if we ignore their horror show against Newcastle, anyway).

Implications

The ramifications of an attack-minded centre back could be significant. Does the opposition assign one of their centre forwards to track a sweeper’s advances? Or does the midfielder who is usually tasked with picking up the holding player have to be shrewd enough to notice when the two have swapped roles?

Employing the sweeper as an attacking threat usually only reaches its full potential when facing an inferior side who are likely to cede possession and field position happily. Alternatively, a strong team who has gone a goal up in an important game may look to defend their lead in numbers – see Liverpool’s surprise victory at Stamford Bridge. Luiz was brought to make at right back in an effort to combat Liverpool’s retreat but spent most of his time in The Reds’ half.

Not such a new concept

While the position of the sweeper has been around for decades, since the advent of the Premier League in 1992 and the domination of the basic 4-4-2 it has rarely been employed in England. Spain’s international supremacy has seen many international teams adopt their 4-2-3-1 formation, which allows defenders and midfielders to switch much more freely. By protecting the central defenders much more deliberately and effectively than a 4-4-2, defenders are granted the liberty to join attacks.

Chelsea have been playing with at least one defensive minded midfielder since they signed Claude Makelele in 2003, while Liverpool adopted the double defensive midfield formation under Rafael Benitez’s tutelage. But until Luiz’s arrival Chelsea depended far too much on their fullbacks to support attacks. Negating Ashley Cole and Jose Bosingwa was a failsafe way of stifling Chelsea under Luis Felipe Scholari, and his over-reliance on the Brazilian tradition of fullbacks providing thrust down the wings saw him sacked. Now Branislav Ivanovic is the incumbent right back, although he is a better player than given credit for, he does not have the pace or dribbling ability of a true wing back. Luiz gives Chelsea a plan B – but will it be enough for them to usurp Tottenham Hotspur or Manchester City and claim a top four finish?

Legend

What is the Makelele Role?

Claude Makelele was the midfield lynchpin of Jose Mourinho’s title winning Chelsea team. Mourinho’s three to five man midfield was able to dominate games and exploit the flaws of the 4-4-2, the biggest one being the lack of “between the lines” players. Makelele played in the space between the centre-backs and the midfield (The Hole) and swept up any balls that came through the midfield. His presence meant that the centerbacks didnt have to follow strikers into midfield and the other central midfielders didnt have to run box to box as they would in a 4-4-2. Makelele was an expert at protecting The Hole and the British media seemed to have never seen such a player so they named the role after him. When in possession he would collect the ball from the centerbacks and play short simple passes to whoever was in space. He was a true holding midfielder in that he rarely looked to join the attack and accepted that his job was more destructive than creative.

The New Makelele ?

Claude Makelele currently plays for PSG in France where his role is very different. PSG play a 4-4-2 system with very attacking wingers, as shown below.

When in possession the formation becomes more of a 4-2-4, leaving Makelele in a two man midfield with Bodmer or Chantome. Being part of a two man midfield requires Makelele to cover a lot more ground even though he is now 37. As the deeper-lying of the two midfielders he is often required to orchestrate attacks from deep and make penetrating throughballs or crossfield passes to the wingers, something he is not known for. If no pass is on he will have to run with the ball or attempt a dribble, something that is definitely not associated with The Makelele Role. As a result he tends to lose possession a lot more often than he did when he played for Chelsea.

He is still very good at disrupting opposition attacks but his positioning in a 4-4-42 sometimes means that he is too far upfield to prevent the counter. He was never a pacey player but at 37 he cannot be expected to play box to box for 90 minutes. At this stage of his career he needs to be paired with a more energetic player in order to be successful. PSG are having their best season in years with Makelele being a vital part of the team so he has shown that he can adapt his game to a 4-4-2 without weakening his team.

Conclusion

Claude Makelele has come to define the holding midfield role but in the twilight of his career he is showing that he is not just a one trick pony. He has been asked to play in a classic 4-4-2 system and has successfully adapted to the role. His attacking play may not be the best but he makes up for it in his excellent reading of the game and his mastery of the art of disruption.

Arsenal’s current defensive problems lie not with their centre backs but with their left back, Gael Clichy. This is an opinion held by many Arsenal fans, including Arsenal Insider’s Josh Benson in his piece, ‘A Look at Gael Clichy’. Johan Djourou has been impeccable of late now he is finally injury free, while Laurent Koscielny is getting better by the game and has been unfortunate to be dismissed twice this season. The duo illustrated against Barcelona in particular how centre backs don’t all have to be of the John Terry/Nemanja Vidic mould; good reading of the game along with a bit of pace and tackling ability also makes a good defender. The Gunners’ young French fullback, however, has been at fault, or at least partially to blame, for key goals in key games for the past two or three years, yet has escaped mainstream criticism due mainly to the myth that a team’s defensive performance can be traced solely to its central defenders.

Going backwards ?

Calling the Frenchman ‘young’ is actually a misnomer, for he is in fact 25. While defenders are generally considered to reach their peak in their late twenties to early thirties, they should not be making mistakes like Clichy did in Arsenal’s latest game at home to Barcelona. And they shouldn’t be making these same mistakes repeatedly. For some reason Clichy still gives off the air of a youth team graduate feeling his way into the first team. He does not exude confidence, and for me is one of the Arsenal players who can accurately be labelled as not having the necessary ‘character’ to dig in and win games when faced with adversity.

Martin Keown, a man who most definitely could defend (albeit in a brutish, old fashioned English manner), said of his former team-mate in December:

“Clichy is going backwards. We all have a bad time at some point maybe he needs to have some time out to look from the outside. It sometimes helps.”

He’s not just a pretty face, our Martin. In fact on his appearances on the Match of the Day sofa he’s often been surprisingly erudite on the finer points of the game for a man who looks like a cartoon caveman.

Keown’s quotation (yes quotation, it’s a noun. Like Clichy’s defending, just because we’ve been making the same mistake since the 1880s, it doesn’t make it right) comes from Just Arsenal, in a piece entitled ‘Why would Read Madrid want Gael Clichy?’ – to which the simple answer is: they wouldn’t. Jose Mourinho prides himself on the solidity and defensive unity of his teams. And he already has one dodgy left back in the form of Brazilian bomber Marcelo.

Arsenal blogger Wrighty7 and the 14 commentators on his article, ‘When Will Clichy Ever Learn’, share the same sentiments. Here’s an excerpt:

“For some reason in the last couple of years he has appeared to go backwards and not pushed on with that potential he has shown in the past. He seems to have a major error in him at least once a game. Sometimes we are punished when he cocks up, tonight being an example, and at other times we get away with it.”

So, enough of this character assassination without basis – let’s look at some of the technical points of Clichy’s play to see where he’s going wrong. Overall Clichy is a good player, with the potential to be a great one. But it’s his worrying lapses in concentration which are holding him and his team back.

David Villa played onside by Clichy

Clichy (red) plays Villa onside

Here’s David Villa’s opener in the recent Champions League game at The Emirates. As Messi advances, Clichy back-pedals and finds himself, crucially, a yard behind the rest of the defensive line. This plays Villa onside, and there aren’t many people who’d back a 20-year-old goalkeeper making his European bow against Spain’s most clinical centre forward. One-nil, and what could prove to be a tie-winning away goal.

Clichy probably drops back because he is wary of the pace of the Barcelona forwards, and of Messi in particular. Who can blame him? Unfortunately in doing this he ruins Djourou’s offside trap and inadvertently plays straight into Messi’s hands.

In the effort of balancing things slightly, Clichy did make amends in the offensive third by setting up Robin van Persie’s goal with a delightful clipped pass on his wrong foot. But this article’s intention is not to analyse the fullback’s attacking game, which is, on the whole, good (possibly even better than his predecessor’s, Ashley Cole).

Park Ji Sung’s easy run on goal

This Park Ji Sung run against Arsenal may seem a harsh illustration of poor defending, as a goal is very difficult to prevent in this situation. Clichy was left in the lurch by his fellow defenders and Park had three options: go alone, pass to Rooney to his right or pass to Nani further right. The South Korean has made a habit of notching against the North London side (four in seven), and by not closing down Clichy made up his mind for him.

Clichy(red) stuck in two minds

When defending a desperate two or three on one situation like this the defender must engage the attacker, thus forcing him to make a decision: pass the ball or take me on. If, as is usual, they elect to pass, they may pick the wrong option, the ball may be badly timed or over hit, or it may simply delay the attack an extra second and allow a covering defender to get in position.

Clichy’s intentions are good; he’s cutting out both passes by positioning himself centrally. But vitally, he’s not cutting out the most imminent danger: Park’s very direct route to goal, and it’s only when Park is inside the penalty area that he realises a pass is not forthcoming and attempts to tackle (0:09). By this time it’s too late. It’s basic stuff, and this goal killed off the game. While not singling out Clichy, The BBC described the goal as “almost an open invitation to slip the simplest of finishes past the exposed Almunia”. In the defender’s defence, his team had naively been pressing too franticly for a goal, as they were only 2-0 down with another 40 minutes to play.

Didier Drogba’s many goals against Arsenal

Another player who loves playing against Arsenal is Didier Drogba, whose 13 goals in as many matches against the Gunners are handily compiled in the above video. As it demonstrates, the Ivorian’s threat is usually, and fairly, attributed to his physical bullying of ‘soft’ Arsenal, but for the goal at 21:10 again it’s Clichy’s defending of a swift counter attack that lets Arsenal down.

Here it may be a case of poor communication. Unlike the Park Ji Sung goal, Arsenal have plenty of red shirts back: five to Chelsea’s four attackers. It’s hard to tell which of Thomas Vermaelen or Gael Clichy is more at fault; it’s a combination of the two, as the former clearly signals for the latter to pick up Drogba, who has pulled out wide into the left back area. Clichy makes an initial move towards Drogba but is then distracted by Nicolas Anelka’s run. In the end both defenders are in the middle of the pitch and neither gets close to Drogba, Chelsea’s best forward and scorer of well over 100 goals in England. He receives a simple pass from Frank Lampard, cuts in past both Clichy and Vermaelen (where else was he going to go?) and finishes easily.

Ciaran Clark’s unchallenged shot

Clichy allows Clark to have a shot at goal

Ciaran Clark’s goal for Aston Villa should not have been allowed, as John Carew was clearly in an offside position whilst in with the goalkeeper’s line of vision as the ball was struck. Regardless, if the youngster had been closed down by the nearest man to him, Clichy, his shot could have easily been blocked. Like in the Park example, Clichy does not address the immediate danger and for some reason backs off as Clark chests the ball, allowing a clear shot on goal from 18 yards that results in a goal.

Darren Bent’s late equaliser

I couldn’t find a video for my final example, but here’s the Guardian’s minute by minute report on Sunderland’s late equaliser against Arsenal this season:

“94 mins 24 seconds: AS DRAMATIC AS YOU LIKE!!! Sunderland 1-1 Arsenal. A melee in the area. Gyan gets the ball stuck under his feet. Clichy slices a terrible clearance about two feet in front of him. Bent pounces, lashing a shot home from six yards.”

Now even the best defenders fluff to occasional clearance, but Clichy’s tendency to panic is not a one off, and it leads to a decisive goal here. Also, in his analysis of Clichy, Benson pointed out the defender’s culpability in the build-up:

“As the rest of the defence pushed up after what should have been the final clearance of the match, Clichy dropped back in, allowing 3 Sunderland players to remain onside and eventually to score.”

Conclusion
As these instances show, Clichy’s errors are often fatal ones, but alarmingly for Arsene Wenger they’re also very basic. Putting a player under pressure by closing down is a fundamental of defending, but the left back’s hesitant nature sees him worry about other attackers or simply make the wrong call when faced with a dangerous situation. Being a fast player one would assume he would be good at dealing with counter attacks, but whether it is a lack of understanding of his role or whether he simply has a mental block, it’s clear that it’s costing Arsenal goals, points, and possibly trophies.

Kieran Gibbs is Wenger’s alternative, but due to injuries has often been unavailable this term. I believe but for this he could well have usurped Clichy in Arsenal’s back line by now, for although he is highly inexperienced he has shown a maturity and calmness that belies his age. Since slipping to allow Park to score the opening goal of the 2009 Champions League semi-final he has not made a major mistake to speak of and will probably be installed as the first team left back by this time next year.

Proactive in attack, reactive in defense

TWO SIDES OF THE SAME COIN

Greece and Chile could not have been any more different in their defensive philosophies. Chile favoured an intense pressing game as outlined here and Greece defended deep and narrow using a strict man marking system. However, they both used reactive defenses where the goal was to always have a spare man at the back. If the opponent played with two strikers, they would react by playing three centerbacks. If the opponent switched to a one striker system they would react by playing only two centerbacks and bringing on an extra midfielder. Greece used this strategy to win Euro 2004 and Chile over-performed in their World Cup qualification by always having an extra man in their backline.

Exponent of old style man marking

This strategy requires a team to have versatile defenders who can play as midfielders or the manager would have to make substitutions every time the opponent makes tactical changes. Bielsa was clearly willing to do this but Rehagel tended to stick to his guns. So far I have yet to see a club team use this strategy. Glasgow Rangers switched to a deep 5 man defense for their Champion’s league games but they used this strategy against one or two strikers so it was not really reactive. Their goal was just to have as many defenders as possible. Sunderland recently switched to a five man defense against Stoke but this seemed to be a one-off to cope with a unique set-piece threat. Liverpool are an intersting case as they switched back to two centerbacks against Wigan’s one striker formation but it is too early to say what Dalglish’s approach is.

PROBLEMS

Even though this strategy works quite well it is not without problems. Chile struggled when playing against “nominal strikers”, that is strikers who started from wide positions. They did not know whether to treat this player as a striker or as a midfielder. This disrupted the reactive defense as Chile would either end up with too many defenders or not enough. Bielsa’s use of midfielders as centerbacks also left him at a disadvantage during set plays, something that was well exploited by Brazil. Otto Rehagel later abandoned the reactive defence in favour of a typical four man backline, maybe feeling he did not have the right players after his experienced defenders retired. There is also the problem of having to predict whether your opponent will line up with one or two strikers, something that requires extensive scouting and a bit of luck.

CONCLUSION

The reactive defense has the huge advantage of always giving a team one and only one extra man at the back. More than one would lead to the team being too weak in midfield and the centerbacks getting in each others way. So far this strategy has not been used by any club side I am aware of even after the over-achievement of Chile and Greece internationally. It probably has not caught on because managers do not want to have to react to every change that the opponent makes and the strategy has been shown to not work very well against nominal strikers. That being said, this season Rangers and Liverpool have shown the advantages of having an extra man in defense so it is not out of the question for teams to change their thinking.

All-Rounder

Holding Everything Together

At Barcelona, Toure had to be very disciplined and supress any desire to join the attack unless it was absolutely necessary. His role was to prevent the counter attack by patrolling the center of the field and also form part of Barcelona’s temporary three man defense when their teamates were attacking. This is a role that requires excellent tactical awareness, good passing and tackling skills and the ability to play as both a midfielder and centerback. Toure played this well until Guardiola decided to go with the cheaper, younger option of Busquets. Keep in mind that Toure also played as a centerback in a Champions League final and did not look out of place, even though he had only played there a few times for Barcelona.  That is how good he is.

Defending From the Front

At Manchester City Toure still has a defensive brief even though he is playing in an attacking position. When his team do not have the ball, Toure’s job is to press the opposition defenders and harass them until they make a mistake or hoof the ball upfield. this prevents the opposition from building attacks from the back. Luciano Spalletti often used Simone Perotta in a similar way at Roma when they used the same false nine tactic that Man City are now using. The effect of both Tevez and Toure harassing defenders is that Mancherster City are able to to win the ball high up the pitch and launch counter attacks. Toure has high stamina levels and is a good tackler so is well suited to play this role. In games where Man City want to defend deeper, Toure plays closer to the double pivot with the intention of clogging up the midfield and making it difficult for the opposition to play. Toure can also play as one of the two holding players when needed to but Mancini prefers him playing further up the pitch. He is the definition of “Box to Box” as it is not unusual to see him win the ball in defense and then run forward to support the resulting counter attack and then run back to help the defense once again.

Excellent Running with the ball

As a result of using the false nine tactic, Manchester City often do not have an out-ball as they cannot lump long balls to Carlos Tevez. Instead they give the ball to Yaya Toure and he runs with it through midfield. He has a lumbering running style but is very effective and his runs with the ball often create space for David Silva and Tevez. Toure is not a dribbler but he has a way of just gliding past defenders who you would expect to be quicker than him. He is also good at making late runs into the box and he loves to finish by passing the ball into the net, a skill most strikers have failed to learn. Opposing managers have still  not realised how dangerous he is because he is still percieved as a defensive midfielder. As a result he often gets a lot of space in midfield and starts off  Manchester City’s best attacking moves.  He also gives Manchester City an aerial target upfront as he is over 1.90m tall and good in the air, something you need when Tevez is your striker.

Conclusion

Yaya Toure is the total footballer, comfortable in defence, all areas of midfield and attack. Roberto Mancini has recognised his excellence and built his midfield around the Ivorian. He is asked to do everything and he does it excellently and without fuss. He will be a key player for Manchester City in the coming months as they look to establish themselves as title contenders.

learning quickly

Lessons Learned

Rafael is very quick and has learned to use this pace to intercept balls in front of the attacker instead of defending passively. Earlier in his United career, he seemed to not be aware of where his man was in relation to the ball but his reading of the game has improved. He also used to get sucked into midfield far too easily and end up making the back four too narrow. This would leave the left winger free to deliver crosses into the box. This is a rare occurance now and he seems to have understood that it is not his role to be a midfield ball winner.

Another huge improvement in Rafael’s game is his aerial ability. In previous seasons teams would target him aerially, in a similar way to how they used to target Patrice Evra. These days you do not see teams trying this strategy because Rafael can hold his own in the air and seems to relish the physical contact. He may be only 1.73 m tall but he leaps very well and has improved the timing of his jumps. I have no doubt that he picked up some tips from Evra, who had to deal with similar challenges. Rafael has also bulked up and does not get muscled off the ball anymore, in fact he is the one who is often too physical.

Another skill Rafael has had to pick up is playing behind a winger and knowing when to overlap. In Brazilian football he would have rarely played with wingers and had more freedom to bomb forward, not just to deliver crosses but to cut in, take on defenders and shoot at goal. He is still showcasing these skills at Man United but in a more disciplined manner. He often plays behind Nani and the two have a good understanding and support each other well.

Room For Improvement

Unfortunately Rafael has a tendency to lunge in when attempting to win the ball. This often happens after he has lost the ball or been beaten on the dribble. This shows an immaturity and a failure to keep his emotions in check. He has already been sent off twice in his young career and been guilty of a few two footed lunges that were not punished. He seems to always want to win the ball back even when it is impossible to do so. What he should do in those situations is guide the attacker into less threatening areas instead of going in for the crunching tackle. He seems to hate to get beaten by wingers and will often use any means necessary to slow them down instead of trusting his team-mates to cover for him. Hopefully he outgrows this habit as it can cost his team dearly.

His competitive spirit often leads him to argue with opposing players (and recently referees). This is dangerous for Rafael as he already has trouble controlling his emotions. As he gets older he will learn to just walk away from those situations as there is nothing to be gained by arguing.

Walk Away

Another flaw in his game is that he is often slow to get back to his right back position after he overlaps and his team lose the ball. This is inexcusable as he is one of the fastest players on his team but he seems to switch off and forget his defensive duties. This is especially dangerous when United are playing a 4-4-2 as there is no holding midfielder to cover for him. During a game you will often see Rio Ferdinand screaming at him to get back into position. Young players will have mental lapses but when you are a defender those lapses often lead to goals so he will have to learn much faster.

Conclusion

Even at 20, Rafael is already a good player and not out of his depth in the biggest games. Ferguson obviously trusts him and often asks him to mark dangerous players such as Robben and Bale. He has improved a lot in a short space of time and seems willing to change his game to suite his European surroundings. If he outgrows his bad habits then I see no reason why he cannot become a world class fullback, a rare thing these days.

I will be away this weekend but I will upload some articles before I leave.

Thank you to all the well wishers and readers. I really appreciate it and glad to see that there is still interest.

Updates will resume at the normal pace from next week